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The World Health Organization (WHO) declares that every
human being has the fundamental right to enjoy “the highest
attainable standard of health.”1 This essential human right is
codified in national constitutions and international treaties, not
simply as a goal but an expectation for the welfare of
populations subjected to adverse economic and medical
conditions. 2 While access to healthcare and medicine is an
integral part of the right to health, “[o]nly 51.8 per cent of
public and 68.5 per cent of private health facilities” in
developing countries can provide essential medicines to their
patients.3 “Prices of available essential medicines tend to be the
multiple of international reference prices.”4 A recent example of
excessive drug pricing comes from Gilead Pharmaceuticals,
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1. Constitution of the World Health Organization, pmbl., July 22, 1946,
62 Stat. 2679, 14 U.N.T.S. 185.
2. Lance Gable & Benjamin Mason Meier, Global Health Rights:
Employing Human Rights to Develop and Implement the Framework
Convention on Global Health, 15 HEALTH & HUM. RTS., no. 1, June 2013, at
17, 17–21.
3. MDG GAP TASK FORCE, MILLENNIUM DEVELOPMENT GOAL 8: THE
GLOBAL PARTNERSHIP FOR DEVELOPMENT: MAKING RHETORIC A REALITY, at
xvi, U.N. Sales No. E.12.I.5 (2012).
4. Id.
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charging $1000 per pill of Sovaldi, a hepatitis C treatment.5
This extreme pricing differential makes purchasing medicine,
particularly for chronic illness, essentially prohibitive for low-
income families in developing countries.6
Increasing affordable access to essential medicines has the
potential to save nearly ten million lives a year, with four
million of those lives being in Africa and Southeast Asia. 7
While better health is critical to happiness and wellbeing, it
also contributes to economic growth and progress.8 A number of
factors are responsible for the enormous inequity in the pricing
of medicine: weak infrastructure, broken health systems,
health worker shortages, “weak regulatory regimes,” expensive
and time-consuming research and development, and markups
“throughout the distribution chain” that lead to higher drug
prices.9 A significant cause of the exorbitant cost of medicine is
the current complex and aggressive intellectual property
landscape, which is exemplified in numerous free trade
agreements, such as the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP)10—
allowing proprietary protections over pharmaceutical patents
to surpass public health needs.
In order to address the immense public health inequity in
trade and patent law practices, the World Trade Organization
(WTO) administered the Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects
5. Margot Sangor-Katz, Boon for Hepatitis C Patients, Disaster for
Prison Budgets, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 7, 2014, at A3; see Innovating and
Expanding Access to Hepatitis C Treatments, GILEAD SCI. (Oct. 2014),
http://www.gilead.com/~/media/Files/pdfs/Policy-Perspectives/ExpandingAcces
stoHCVTreatments10214.pdf (discussing Gilead’s drug Sovaldi).
6. SeeMDGGAP TASK FORCE, supra note 3, at 63–64.
7. DEP’T FOR INT’L DEV., INCREASING ACCESS TO ESSENTIAL MEDICINES
IN THE DEVELOPING WORLD: U.K. GOVERNMENT POLICY AND PLANS 8 (2004),
available at https://hospicecare.com/uploads/2011/8/dfid_access_medicines.pdf.
8. Health and Development, WORLD HEALTH ORG., http://www.who.int
/hdp/en/ (last visited Sept. 11, 2014).
9. Brook K. Baker, Patents, Pricing, and Access to Medicines in
Developing Countries, 11 VIRTUALMENTOR 527, 527 (2009).
10. See generally U.N. DEV. PROGRAMME, U.N. AIDS, THE POTENTIAL
IMPACT OF FREE TRADE AGREEMENTS ON PUBLIC HEALTH 3–5 (2012),
available at http://www.unaids.org/en/media/unaids/contentassets/documents
/unaidspublication/2012/JC2349_Issue_Brief_Free-Trade-Agreements_en.pdf
(discussing TRIPS-plus obligations contained in free trade agreements and the
potential negative impacts on price and access).
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of Intellectual Property Rights (widely known as TRIPS).11 The
TRIPS Agreement employs various provisions to ensure public
health needs are addressed through international trade; these
provisions are referred to as “flexibilities.” 12 The past two
decades have seen an increasing number of developing nations
successfully utilize the flexibilities provided by TRIPS, which
aim to lower costs and increase access to medicine by
facilitating the importation of generic formulas.13 While TRIPS
has made progress by bringing public health needs on par with
global patent rights, many countries have not yet amended
their laws to incorporate full TRIPS flexibilities. 14 An
increasing number of bilateral and multilateral free trade
agreements include intellectual property protections that
greatly exceed the minimum intellectual property standards of
TRIPS, thus hindering the use of such flexibilities.15
The advent of the TPP, a proposed trade agreement
between twelve countries including the United States,
potentially poses the most aggressive pharmaceutical
intellectual property provisions to date.16 Part I of this Note
will review the development of the TPP and its intellectual
property provisions as well as the history of trade and
medicine, particularly focusing on the restrictions of the TRIPS
flexibilities. Part II will specifically discuss how the TPP’s
intellectual property provisions will adversely impact global
11. Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights,
Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade
Organization, Annex 1C, 108 Stat. 4809, 1869 U.N.T.S. 299 [hereinafter
TRIPS Agreement].
12. See MDG GAP TASK FORCE, supra note 3, at xvi (introducing TRIPS
flexibilities).
13. Id.
14. U.N. DEV. PROGRAMME, U.N. AIDS, USING TRIPS FLEXIBILITIES TO
IMPROVE ACCESS TO HIV TREATMENT: POLICY BRIEF 2–3, 8 (2011), available
at http://www.unaids.org/en/media/unaids/contentassets/documents/unaids
publication/2011/JC2049_PolicyBrief_TRIPS_en.pdf.
15. Pedro Roffe & Christoph Spennemann, The Impact of FTAs on Public
Health and TRIPS Flexibilities, 1 INT’L J. INTELL. PROP. MGMT. 75, 76–80, 86
(2006).
16. How Does Evergreening Restrict Access to Medicines?, MEDECINS SANS
FRONTIERES, http://aids2012.msf.org/2012/the-trans-pacific-partnership-agree
ment-evergreening/ (last visited Sept. 11, 2014) (stating that the United
States is “demanding aggressive intellectual property” provisions); see infra
Part I.
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access to affordable medicines and a partner nation’s ability to
utilize existing TRIPS flexibilities. Part II will also include
recommendations to keep the TPP consistent with TRIPS in
order to balance patent rights for the pharmaceutical industry
with broader public health and bioethical goals.
I. BACKGROUND
A. THE TRANS-PACIFIC PARTNERSHIPDEFINED
The TPP is a proposed plurilateral17 free trade agreement
currently under negotiations between the United States and a
number of nations in the Asia-Pacific.18 It stems from earlier
established trade negotiations between four nations: Brunei
Darussalam, Chile, New Zealand, and Singapore.19 In 2003,
Chile, New Zealand, and Singapore set out to establish a viable
path to liberalize regional trade in the Asia-Pacific, and Brunei
Darussalam joined in 2005. 20 At various points the United
States, Australia, Peru, Canada, Mexico, Japan, Vietnam, and
Malaysia have joined the negotiations. 21 Some nations are
committed parties to the TPP, while others, such as Taiwan,
the Philippines, and South Korea “have expressed interest in
joining the TPP negotiations.”22
17. A plurilateral agreement is a multi-national trade agreement between
three or more countries. See Michitaka Nakatomi, Plurilateral Agreements: A
Viable Alternative to the World Trade Organization? 2 (Asian Dev. Bank Inst.,
Working Paper No. 439, 2013), available at http://www.adbi.org/files
/2013.10.24.wp439.plurilateral.agreements.alternative.wto.pdf.
18. Trans-Pacific Partnership: Frequently Asked Questions, OFF. U.S.
TRADE REPRESENTATIVE, http://www.ustr.gov/sites/default/files/TPPFAQ.pdf
(last visited Sept. 15, 2014).
19. Meredith Kolsky Lewis, The Trans-Pacific Partnership: New
Paradigm or Wolf in Sheep’s Clothing?, 34 B.C. INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 27, 29
(2011).
20. IAN F. FERGUSSON ET AL., CONG. RESEARCH SERV., THE TRANS-
PACIFIC PARTNERSHIP NEGOTIATIONS AND ISSUES FOR CONGRESS 3 (2013),
available at http://fas.org/sgp/crs/row/R42694.pdf.
21. T. Rajamoorthy, And Then There Were Twelve: The Origins and
Evolution of the TPPA, THIRD WORLD RESURGENCE, no. 275, July 2013, at 4–
6, available at http://www.twnside.org.sg/title2/resurgence/2013/pdf/275.pdf.
22. GENERIC PHARM. ASS’N ET AL., JOINT POSITION STATEMENT ON THE
TRANS PACIFIC PARTNERSHIP (TPP) NEGOTIATIONS 1 (2013), available at
http://www.gphaonline.org/media/cms/Joint_Position_Statement_on_the_Tran
s_Pacific_Partnership.pdf.
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The stated goals of the nations negotiating the TPP vary.
For some, it serves as a model free trade agreement that will
set high standards for trade and investment in the region.23 For
the United States, the TPP offers a strong foothold in an
increasingly important area of global commerce.24 Additionally,
the United States hopes more countries will join the TPP,
increasing financial opportunities and access to an even larger
market.25 The TPP is established to be a living agreement,
meaning membership can expand and covenants will adapt as
issues emerge.26
Overall, the TPP aims to liberalize the economies of the
Asia-Pacific through a comprehensive tariff reduction. 27 Its
scope goes further by addressing issues related to market
access, rules of origin, investment, financial services,
intellectual property, agriculture, competition, and the
environment.28 Member nations also discuss issues pertaining
23. N.Z. MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS & TRADE, THE TRANS-PACIFIC
STRATEGIC ECONOMIC PARTNERSHIP AGREEMENT 1 (2009), available at
http://www.mfat.govt.nz/downloads/trade-agreement/transpacific/transPac-Fa
ctsheet-2Mar09.pdf.
24. See OFFICE OF THE U.S. TRADE REPRESENTATIVE, 2009 TRADE POLICY
AGENDA AND 2008 ANNUAL REPORT OF THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES
ON THE TRADE AGREEMENTS PROGRAM 127 (2009), available at
http://www.ustr.gov/webfm_send/2558 (“The TPP will serve to strengthen U.S.
trade and investment ties to the Trans-Pacific region, which is a priority given
the economic significance of the region to the United States now and in the
future.”).
25. See Rajamoorthy, supra note 21, at 4–5.
26. Outlines of the Trans-Pacific Partnership Agreement, OFF. U.S. TRADE
REPRESENTATIVE, http://www.ustr.gov/about-us/press-office/fact-sheets/2011
/november/outlines-trans-pacific-partnership-agreement (last visited Oct. 22,
2014); see also Trans-Pacific Partnership Agreement Negotiations, AUSTL. GOV.
DEPARTMENT FOREIGN AFF. & TRADE, http://www.dfat.gov.au/fta/tpp/ (last
visited Nov. 17, 2014) (noting Australia’s position in support of expanding
membership to strengthen trade relationships in the region).
27. See FERGUSSON ET AL., supra note 20, at summary.
28. Outlines of the Trans-Pacific Partnership Agreement, supra note 26;
see also Trans-Pacific Partnership Free Trade Agreement Negotiations,
FOREIGN AFF. TRADE & DEV. CAN. (Dec. 12, 2013), http://www.international
.gc.ca/trade-agreements-accords-commerciaux/agr-acc/tpp-ptp/info.aspx (“The
TPP addresses new trade issues and 21st century challenges, exploring both
tariff and non-tariff barriers to trade and investment, with the goal of
facilitating the movement of people, goods, services, capital, and data across
borders.”).
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to market access, packages for goods, services, temporary
workers, customs, and government procurement.29
The TPP concluded its most recent round of negotiations in
May of 2014.30 The negotiations were expected to come to a
close by the end of 2013; however, some issues have taken
longer to iron out, thus extending the timeline.31 The TPP’s
proposed intellectual property provisions are one of the main
provisions responsible for delays in reaching a consensus
among parties.32
The TPP’s intellectual property chapter, which was
proposed by the United States, is a major source of controversy,
particularly its effects on pharmaceutical patents and digital
innovation.33 The negotiations for the TPP are closed to the
public as well as members of Congress and details of the
agreement have been shrouded in secrecy.34 However, in May
2012 Congressman Darrell Issa of California leaked the
February and September 2011 drafts of the U.S. proposal for
intellectual property protections.35 Additionally, on November
13, 2013, WikiLeaks founder Jullian Assange leaked a draft of
29. Outlines of the Trans-Pacific Partnership Agreement, supra note 26.
30. Press Release, Office of the U.S. Trade Representative, Joint
Statement at the TPP Ministers Meeting in Singapore (May 2014), available at
http://www.ustr.gov/about-us/press-office/press-releases/2014/May/Joint-State
ment-at-the-TPP-Ministers-Meeting-in-Singapore.
31. Shawn Donnan & Ben Bland, TPP Leaders Say ‘Significant Progress’
Made, FIN. TIMES (Oct. 8, 2013), http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/fdfe4b36-2fe5-11e3
-9eec-00144feab7de.html#axzz2ixpGnIL3.
32. Henry Farrell, The TPP Is Not an Agreement Among Like-Minded
Countries, WASH. POST (Dec. 12, 2013), http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs
/monkey-cage/wp/2013/12/12/the-tpp-is-not-an-agreement-among-like-minded
-countries/ (highlighting the United States’ hardline stance on intellectual
property chapter negotiations).
33. Trans-Pacific Partnership Agreement, ELECTRONIC FRONTIER FOUND.,
https://www.eff.org/issues/tpp (last visited Sept. 16, 2014).
34. Carolina Rossini & Maira Sutton, What Is Wrong with the Trans-
Pacific Partnership, ELECTRONIC FRONTIER FOUND. (Aug. 21, 2012),
https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2012/08/whats-wrong-tpp.
35. Press Release, Congressman Darrell Issa, Issa Releases the Trans
Pacific Partnership Intellectual Property Rights Chapter on
KeepTheWebOPEN.com (May 15, 2012), available at http://issa.house.gov
/press-releases/2012/05/issa-releases-the-trans-pacific-partnership-intellectual
-property-rights-chapter-on-keepthewebopencom/.
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the TPP—right before chief negotiators met in Salt Lake City,
Utah.36
TPP member nations agree to abide by the minimum
standards established by TRIPS and also expand on those
standards, greatly increasing patent protections. 37 The
negotiations have covered “trademarks, geographical
indications, copyright and related rights, patents, trade
secrets,” genetic resources, and traditional knowledge. 38
Statements from U.S. officials seem to indicate that the TPP is
intended to set a precedent for future trade agreements and
practices.39
B. HISTORICAL LANDSCAPE OF TRADE ANDMEDICINES
Historically, the limited availability and high price of
essential medicines were attributed to the lack of consistent
patent law and trade practices in the global market.40 The
TRIPS Agreement introduced intellectual property law
standards into the global trading system in 1995. 41 TRIPS
requires member nations to abide by minimum standards for
the protection and enforcement of “nearly all forms of
intellectual property rights (IP), patents, copyrights, and trade
36. Press Release, WikiLeaks, Secret Trans-Pacific Partnership
Agreement (TPP)—IP Chapter (Nov. 13, 2013), available at
https://wikileaks.org/tpp/pressrelease.html.
37. Outlines of the Trans-Pacific Partnership Agreement, supra note 26.
38. Id.
39. The Trans Pacific Partnership Agreement: Challenges and Potential:
Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Terrorism, Nonproliferation & Trade & the
Subcomm. on Asia Pac. of the Comm. of Foreign Affairs of the U.S.H.R., 112th
Cong. 2–3 (2012) (statement of Susan C. Schwab, former U.S. Trade Rep.),
available at http://archives.republicans.foreignaffairs.house.gov/112/HHRG-11
2-FA18-WState-SchwabS-20120517.pdf.
40. Ellen ‘t Hoen, TRIPS, Pharmaceutical Patents, and Access to Essential
Medicines: A Long Way from Seattle to Doha, 3 CHI. J. INT’L L. 27, 27–31
(2002). See generally S. CTR., THE DOHA DECLARATION ON TRIPS AND PUBLIC
HEALTH TEN YEARS LATER: THE STATE OF IMPLEMENTATION 1–4 (2011),
available at http://www.southcentre.int/wp-content/uploads/2013/06/PB7_-Do
ha-Declaration-on-TRIPS-and-Health_-EN.pdf (discussing the “significant
changes” brought on by TRIPS to create more consistent “standards of IP
protection”).
41. See WTO and the TRIPS Agreement, WORLD HEALTH ORG.,
http://www.who.int/medicines/areas/policy/wto_trips/en/ (last visited Sept. 11,
2014).
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secrets, including those applicable to pharmaceuticals.” 42
Developing countries that did not previously acknowledge
product patents in areas such as pharmaceuticals had to
modify their laws to become TRIPS compliant and grant
patents on medicines.43 Such compliance makes it even more
difficult for cheaper drugs to enter the market since TRIPS-
obliging countries would have to abide by long pharmaceutical
patent terms.44
TRIPS’s scope covers general principles, standards for the
use of patents, intellectual property enforcement, dispute
settlement, and other subjects.45 Under its key provision, WTO
member nations must offer patent protection for at least
twenty years from the filing date of the patent application for
any product or process that fulfills the criteria of novel, non-
obvious, and usefulness.46 Before TRIPS, the duration for such
protection was significantly shorter—around sixteen years.47
Certain developing countries granted patents for even shorter
terms, such as five to seven years.48 TRIPS also standardizes
the absolute protection of a product rather than protecting only
a process. 49 Process patents would protect respective
technology and the process or manufacturing method.50 Such
patent protection does not prevent skilled manufacturers from
reverse engineering medicine and marketing it.51
Prior to patent rule pluralism, countries routinely
discriminated between fields of invention, for example
excluding medicine patents, giving national policymakers
42. Baker, supra note 9, at 528.
43. S. CTR., supra note 40, at 1.
44. See Baker, supra note 9 (expressing concern that TRIPS may in fact
lead to even higher prices for medicine). But see S. CTR., supra note 40, at 1, 4–
5 (“[TRIPS flexibilities] may be used to stimulate competition . . . in order to
encourage access to medicines at prices affordable to governments and
patients.”); WTO and the TRIPS Agreement, supra note 41 (discussing how
TRIPS flexibilities help offset higher prices in the face of long pharmaceutical
patent terms).
45. See generally TRIPS Agreement, supra note 11.
46. Id. at art. 27.1, 33.
47. WTO and the TRIPS Agreement, supra note 41.
48. Id.
49. TRIPS Agreement, supra note 11, at art. 27.
50. Id.
51. Id.
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rather than market forces control over drug prices.52 TRIPS
explicitly prohibits this type of market bias.53 Pharmaceutical
manufacturers are better able to dictate where drugs are made
because countries cannot “discriminate against importing goods
in favor of local products.” 54 This allows pharmaceutical
producers to consolidate monopoly power globally by controlling
the place of production.55 TRIPS prohibits non-inventors from
utilizing, marketing, importing, and manufacturing patented
processes and products.56 Such intellectual property protection
can proliferate monopolies and raise prices.57 Drug companies
further alienate needy populations by pricing them out, selling
primarily to insured or the wealthy even if much of a nation’s
population cannot benefit from the innovation.58
Many countries that undertake evaluating the quality,
safety, and efficacy of medicines require new pharmaceutical
products to submit test data for review by a regulatory
agency. 59 TRIPS instituted an undisclosed data protection
standard. 60 This provision grants the original inventor
exclusive rights over their undisclosed test data, preventing
national regulatory authorities, such as the U.S. Food and
Drug Administration, from relying on such data when
evaluating generic alternatives.61 TRIPS provides an exception
52. Baker, supra note 9, at 528.
53. TRIPS Agreement, supra note 11, at art. 27.1.
54. Baker, supra note 9, at 528; see also TRIPS Agreement, supra note 11,
at art. 27.1 (“[P]atent rights shall be available and patent rights enjoyable
without discrimination as to the place of invention . . . and whether products
are imported or locally produced.”).
55. Baker, supra note 9, at 528.
56. Id.; see TRIPS Agreement, supra note 11, at art. 28 (providing the
rights a patent confers on its owner under TRIPS).
57. Baker, supra note 9, at 528.
58. See id. (“[I]ts profit-maximizing strategy in developing countries is
typically to sell medicines at high prices to the rich even if that price excludes
purchase by or for the vast majority of a country’s population.”).
59. WORLD HEALTH ORG. ET AL., PROMOTING ACCESS TO MEDICAL
TECHNOLOGIES AND INNOVATION: INTERSECTIONS BETWEEN PUBLIC HEALTH,
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND TRADE 65–66 (2012), available at
http://wto.org/english/res_e/booksp_e/pamtiwhowipowtoweb13_e.pdf.
60. TRIPS Agreement, supra note 11, at art. 39.3 (stating that WTO
members must protect undisclosed test data on pharmaceutical products
against unfair competition).
61. CARLOS MARÍA CORREA, S. CTR., PROTECTION OF DATA SUBMITTED
FOR THE REGISTRATION OF PHARMACEUTICALS: IMPLEMENTING THE
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to its test data protection when the use of such data would
protect the public.62
In order to balance the rights of pharmaceutical patent
holders with international public health needs, TRIPS offers
flexibilities to countries to safeguard access to medicines. 63
Nations are permitted to apply their own rigorous patentability
standards such as degree of novelty or inventive step.64 TRIPS-
compliant nations are also allowed to issue compulsory
licenses, which permit a government to allow the sale and
manufacture of patented medicine without the patent holder’s
consent. 65 Compulsory licensing and government use are
subject to a number of conditions aimed at protecting patent
holder interests.66 For example, a company applying for such a
license to market or manufacture patented medicine must first
attempt to obtain a voluntary license from the patent holder
“on reasonable commercial grounds.”67 If this attempt is not
successful, then the country can seek a compulsory license.68 If
a compulsory license is granted, appropriate remuneration
must be paid to the patent holder. 69 To further balance
intellectual property protection with public health goals, TRIPS
allows this requirement to be waived by a member nation in
the event of a “national emergency or other circumstances of
extreme urgency or in cases of public non-commercial use.”70
“In situations of national emergency or other circumstances of
extreme urgency,” the right holder must still “be notified as
soon as reasonably practicable.”71
STANDARDS OF THE TRIPS AGREEMENT 8 (2002), available at
http://www.who.int/medicines/areas/policy/protection_of_data.pdf.
62. WORLDHEALTHORG. ET AL., supra note 59, at 64.
63. Globalization, TRIPS and Access to Pharmaceuticals, WHO POL’Y
PERSP. ON MEDS. (World Health Org., Geneva, Switz.), Mar. 2001, at 5,
available at http://apps.who.int/medicinedocs/pdf/s2240e/s2240e.pdf.
64. Baker, supra note 9, at 528.
65. See TRIPS Agreement, supra note 11, at art. 31 (establishing the
availability and parameters of compulsory licenses); Globalization, TRIPS and
Access to Pharmaceuticals, supra note 63, at 3 (labeling TRIPS article 31 as
compulsory licensing).
66. TRIPS Agreement, supra note 11, at art. 31.
67. Id. at art. 31(b).
68. Id.
69. Id. at art. 31(h).
70. Id. at art. 31(b).
71. Id.
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Another key flexibility TRIPS provides is permissible
parallel importation, which is the practice of taking drugs
“marketed by the patent holder . . . or with the patent owner’s
permission in one country” and importing them “into another
country without approval” from the patent holder.72 This is a
key provision as it allows nations in need to take advantage of
pharmaceutical pricing differentials. 73 Parallel importation
operates under the legal principle that the original patent
rights are exhausted once a batch of drugs is initially sold.74
For example, if a pharmaceutical company markets a patented
drug more cheaply in country A than in country B, country B
could import the drug from country A and save money. This is
perfectly permissible under TRIPS.75 The parallel importation
flexibility allows nations “to comparison shop for a brand-name
medicine if it was sold elsewhere at a lower price.”76
TRIPS remains the most comprehensive international
covenant on intellectual property. However, many developing
nations called for a narrow interpretation of TRIPS, leading the
WTO to adopt the Doha Declaration on the TRIPS Agreement
and Public Health in 2001—a statement that aims to clarify
the scope of TRIPS.77 The Doha Declaration provides articles
requiring the interpretation of TRIPS to reflect a manner
supportive of public health, by promoting both access to
existing medicines as well as research and development into
new medicines. 78 The Doha Declaration clarifies that this
means member nations can choose how to deal with drug
72. World Trade Organization, Ministerial Declaration on the TRIPS
Agreement and Public Health of 14 November 2001, WT/MIN(01)/DEC/2, 41
I.L.M. 755, at para. 5(d) (2002) [hereinafter Doha Declaration]; World Trade
Organization, Ministerial Declaration of 14 November 2001,
WT/MIN(01)/DEC/1, 41 I.L.M. 746 (2002) [hereinafter Ministerial
Declaration]; see also TRIPS Agreement, supra note 11, at art. 6; Fact Sheet:
TRIPS and Pharmaceutical Patents Obligations and Exceptions,
WORLD TRADE ORG. (Sept. 2006), http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/trips
_e/factsheet_pharm02_e.htm.
73. Baker, supra note 9, at 528.
74. Fact Sheet: TRIPS and Pharmaceutical Patents Obligations and
Exceptions, supra note 72.
75. Id.
76. Baker, supra note 9, at 528.
77. See generally Doha Declaration, supra note 72 (attempting to
delineate the scope and purpose of TRIPS).
78. Id. at paras. 4, 7.
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patent terms in a way that best fits their domestic policy
objectives.79
The Doha Declaration provides that TRIPS “does not and
should not prevent Members from taking measures to protect
public health.”80 It underscores a country’s ability to utilize the
flexibilities that are built into TRIPS, including compulsory
licensing and parallel importation.81 Unfortunately, the Doha
Declaration does not give guidance on what conditions must be
met to utilize the compulsory licensing flexibility for a national
public health emergency.82 The extent of the direction provided
gives member states the right to determine what constitutes a
national emergency or other circumstance of extreme urgency
with regard to public health, such as matters related to
“HIV/AIDS, tuberculosis, malaria and other epidemics . . . or
other circumstances of extreme urgency.”83
C. EXPANDING BEYOND TRIPS PATENT PROTECTION
While TRIPS has made progress bringing public health
needs on par with global patent rights, barriers preventing
access to affordable medicines still remain complex and
prevalent. Despite the clarity provided by the Doha
Declaration, in recent years, many developing nations were
pressured to enact or implement even more strict and
restrictive conditions in their patent laws than required by the
TRIPS Agreement—these are known as TRIPS-plus
provisions.84 International law does not require countries to do
this; however, as part of trade agreements with the European
Union and United States, many nations such as Brazil, China,
and several Central American states have had no choice but to
79. Id. at para. 5(d).
80. Id. at para. 4.
81. See id. (“[W]e reaffirm the right of WTO Members to use, to the full,
the provisions in the TRIPS Agreement, which provide flexibility for this
purpose.”).
82. See, e.g., id. at para. 5 (providing no guidance on specific requirements
or conditions, and instead granting each member “the right to determine what
constitutes a national emergency or other circumstances of extreme urgency”).
83. Id. at para. 5(c).
84. U.N. DEV. PROGRAMME, supra note 10, at 3.
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adopt TRIPS-plus provisions.85 Trade agreements heavily filled
with TRIPS-plus provisions have a fairly adverse impact on
access to medicines.86
Mohammad El Said, an international trade law professor
at Lancashire Law School says,
The post-TRIPS era may be best described as a dynamic one.
Contrary to the developing countries’ belief that TRIPS would put an
end to the regulation of intellectual property globally, the post-
TRIPS era has witnessed the intensification of efforts to strengthen
the protection levels of intellectual property beyond those
established under TRIPS, creating the TRIPS-plus phenomenon.87
While the TRIPS flexibilities and the Doha Declaration’s
clarifying text help ensure more equitable access to affordable
medicines in theory, the reality is quite different.88
The United States has taken a heavy-handed approach to
trade policy, threatening countries such as Thailand, South
Africa, and Brazil with trade sanctions because they refused to
grant patent protections stronger than those required in TRIPS
and attempted to utilize the flexibilities guaranteed by TRIPS
to access more affordable medicines.89 This retaliation, taking
the form of withdrawing special zero-tariff trade access or
pulling U.S. foreign investment, continues even after the
United States signed the Doha Declaration.90
TRIPS is intended to strike a balance between long term
social objectives of providing incentives for future inventions
and creation, and short term objectives of allowing people to
85. TRIPS, TRIPS Plus and Doha, MEDECINS SANS FRONTIERES,
http://www.msfaccess.org/content/trips-trips-plus-and-doha (last updated July
2011).
86. Id.
87. MOHAMMED K. EL SAID, WORLD HEALTH ORG., PUBLIC HEALTH
RELATED TRIPS-PLUS PROVISIONS IN BILATERAL TRADE AGREEMENTS: A
POLICY GUIDE FOR NEGOTIATORS AND IMPLEMENTERS IN THE WHO EASTERN
MEDITERRANEAN REGION 92 (2010), available at http://applications.emro
.who.int/dsaf/dsa1081.pdf.
88. Jerome H. Reichman, Comment, Compulsory Licensing of
Pharmaceutical Inventions: Evaluating the Options, 37 J.L. MED. & ETHICS
247, 248 (2009).
89. See ‘t Hoen, supra note 40, at 29–33 (discussing U.S. pressure and
threats against South Africa and Brazil); Reichman, supra note 88, at 247,
258–59 (highlighting pressure and threats against Thailand).
90. Reichman, supra note 88, at 258.
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use existing inventions and creations. 91 TRIPS’s flexibilities
allow governments to modify broad intellectual property
protections granted in order to meet social goals—to some
degree.92 Governments are able to permit exceptions to patent
holder rights in the face of national emergencies, anti-
competitive practices, and lack of access.93
Unfortunately, the flexibilities provided by TRIPS were not
able to significantly improve access to medicine as barriers
continue to suppress utilization. “Many countries have yet to
amend their laws to incorporate” optimal use of the flexibilities,
“which is a precondition for their use.”94 A United Nations’
Development Program study “conducted in 2007 found that
only six countries had a provision on the international
exhaustion of rights in their legislation.” 95 The World
Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO) suggests a fairly
diverse picture of the uniform incorporation of TRIPS
flexibilities in national patent laws.96
Past TRIPS-plus provisions that may adversely impact
public health or hamper the use of TRIPS flexibilities include:
limiting the conditions for granting compulsory licenses;
allowing for the possibility of expanding patent terms beyond
twenty years in order to make up for delays in the patent
granting or regulatory approval processes; “requiring drug
regulatory authorities, most of which have” little experience
with patentable criteria, to evaluate the patent status of a drug
as a condition for “granting marketing authorizations to
generic manufacturers”; and requiring stringent test data
protection limiting drug regulatory authorities from relying on
91. E.g., Doha Declaration, supra note 72, at para. 7 (“We reaffirm the
commitment of developed-country Members to provide incentives to their
enterprises and institutions to promote and encourage technology transfer to
least-developed country Members . . . .”); Ministerial Declaration, supra note
72, at para. 17.
92. See Doha Declaration, supra note 72.
93. See supra notes 72–76 and accompanying text; see also Doha
Declaration, supra note 72, at paras. 4–5.
94. U.N. DEV. PROGRAMME, supra note 14, at 8.
95. Id.
96. WORLD INTELLECTUAL PROP. ORG., PATENT RELATED FLEXIBILITIES IN
THE MULTILATERAL LEGAL FRAMEWORK AND THEIR LEGISLATIVE
IMPLEMENTATION AT THE NATIONAL AND REGIONAL LEVELS (2010), available
at http://www.wipo.int/meetings/en/doc_details.jsp?doc_id=131629.
2015] PUBLIC HEALTH IMPERATIVE 491
clinical test data from bio-similar pharmaceutical products in
order to approve generic alternatives for a certain length of
time. 97 This practice: prohibits generic manufacturers from
relying on such data to demonstrate the safety and efficacy of
their bio-similars, thus delaying the entry of low cost
alternatives to the market; restricts the grounds of patent
revocation; requires countries to broaden patentability criteria
without taking domestic policy into account; expands the
breadth of intellectual property protection by permitting the
patenting of new uses or methods of using a known product;
and allows patent-holders to squander parallel importation,
which will effectively “prevent developing nations from buying
medicines from the cheapest global supplier.”98 The aggregate
effect of these barriers essentially eviscerates a TRIPS-
compliant nation’s opportunity to offer its consumers accessible
and affordable drugs.99 This is particularly harmful for cases
involving treatments where generic alternatives are not
available, such as patented second-line HIV/AIDS drugs.100
Patents should be of the highest quality and should reward
only genuine innovations in order to prevent so-called
“evergreening.” 101 According to the WHO Commission on
Intellectual Property Rights, Innovation and Public Health,
“‘evergreening’ occurs when, in the absence of any apparent
additional therapeutic benefits, patent-holders use various
strategies to extend the length of their exclusivity beyond the
20-year patent term.”102 Providing for public health sensitive
patent examination guidelines as well as a process to challenge
patent claims before and after they are granted may reduce the
97. E.g., U.N. DEV. PROGRAMME, supra note 14, at 8–9.
98. Id.
99. Susan K. Sell, TRIPS Was Never Enough: Vertical Forum Shifting,
FTAS, ACTA, and TPP, 18 J. INTELL. PROP. L. 447, 454 (2011).
100. See U.N. DEV. PROGRAMME, supra note 14, at 1–2 (discussing the
pricing and affordability of HIV/AIDS drugs); Sell, supra note 99, at 454.
101. See infra note 102 and accompanying text.
102. WORLD HEALTH ORG., PUBLIC HEALTH, INNOVATION AND
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS: REPORT OF THE COMMISSION ON
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS, INNOVATION AND PUBLIC HEALTH 131
(2006) [hereinafter COMMISSION REPORT ON IP RIGHTS], available at
http://www.who.int/intellectualproperty/documents/thereport/ENPublicHealth
Report.pdf.
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prevalence of patenting products and process with no true
innovation.103
D. THENEED TO SCRUTINIZE THE TRANS-PACIFIC PARTNERSHIP
TRIPS set the standard for public health and trade on an
international scale. However, it has yet to meet its own
goals.104 This failure is exemplified by the lack of guidance for
developing nations to operationalize the flexibilities clarified by
the Doha Declaration.105
On December 9, 2013, WikiLeaks released excerpts of
internal government commentary on the state of current TPP
negotiations, including the issue positions of countries
negotiating after a recent round of talks in Salt Lake City.106
The document reflects deep divisions between the United
States’ aggressive stance and most other negotiating parties’
positions on intellectual property rights and
pharmaceuticals.107 The commentary also iterates that the U.S.
Chief Negotiators continue to put great pressure on opposing
nations. 108 This suggests that the TPP talks might only
conclude if the Asia-Pacific nations acquiesce on key national
interest issues, otherwise the treaty could fail to come to
fruition altogether.
The TPP’s potential impact on intellectual property laws,
particularly with regard to pharmaceutical patents, has caused
a great deal of controversy among public interest groups
around the world. 109 The TPP’s intellectual property
103. Id. at 131–34.
104. See generally Erik Alsegård, Global Pharmaceutical Patents After the
Doha Declaration—What Lies in the Future, 1 SCRIPTED 12, 19–23 (2004),
available at http://www2.law.ed.ac.uk/ahrc/script-ed/docs/doha.asp (examining
the complaints against and problems caused by TRIPS).
105. See, e.g., id. at 29–36 (highlighting the lack of guidance, particularly
in the context of compulsory licensing, under TRIPS).
106. Press Release, WikiLeaks, Second Release of Secret Trans-Pacific
Partnership Agreement Documents (Dec. 9, 2013), available at
https://wikileaks.org/tpp/pressrelease.html.
107. TPP State of Play After Salt Lake City 19–24 November 2013 Round of
Negotiations, WIKILEAKS, http://wikileaks.org/IMG/pdf/tpp-salt-lake-extracts
-.pdf (last visited Nov. 18, 2014).
108. Id.
109. See, e.g., Press Release, Pub. Citizen, Controversial Trade Pact Text
Leaked, Shows U.S. Trade Officials Have Agreed to Terms That Undermine
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controversy is significant due to the historical complexities
surrounding access to affordable medicines in developing
nations. 110 Senator Ron Wyden, Congressional Chair of the
Committee with jurisdiction over the TPP and who was also
denied access to the negotiation texts said, “‘[t]he majority of
Congress is being kept in the dark as to the substance of the
TPP negotiations, while representatives of U.S. corporations—
like Halliburton, Chevron, PhaRMA [sic], Comcast and the
Motion Picture Association of America—are being consulted
and made privy to details of the agreement.’”111
There is also evidence of the pharmaceutical industry’s
efforts to persuade TPP negotiators to protect intellectual
property rights over any efforts to mitigate the adverse impact
of such aggressive intellectual property right protections.112 In
a leaked letter, “the Intellectual Property (IP) Task Force of the
U.S. Business Coalition for TPP, [which] represents a cross-
sectoral group of US companies and business groups including
the Pharmaceutical Research and Manufacturers of America
(PhRMA), the US Chamber of Commerce, and the Motion
Picture Association of America (MPAA),”113 stated that the TPP
should “provide that IP rights should not be undermined by
other government pricing and regulatory mechanisms that
significantly devalue IP protection.”114 The language used in
the letter, which was sent to the Office of the United States
Obama Domestic Agenda (June 13, 2012), available at
http://www.citizen.org/pressroom/pressroomredirect.cfm?ID=3630 (expressing
significant concern over the secrecy of the TPP negotiations and the contents
of the leaked text).
110. See supra notes 94–100 and accompanying text.
111. Nile Bowie, The Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP), An Oppressive US-
Led Free Trade Agreement, A Corporate Power-Tool of the 1%, GLOBAL RES.
(Apr. 2, 2013), http://www.globalresearch.ca/the-trans-pacific-partnership-tpp-
an-oppressive-us-led-free-trade-agreement-a-corporate-power-tool-of-the-1/53
29497. Pharmaceutical Research and Manufacturers of America (PhRMA) is a
trade organization representing the lobbying interests of the American
pharmaceutical industry. See About PhRMA, PhRMA,
http://www.phrma.org/about (last visited Jan. 11, 2015).
112. Judit Rius, US Industry IP Memo for the TPP Negotiations Leaked,
KNOWLEDGE ECON. INT’L (Dec. 13, 2010), http://keionline.org/node/1034.
113. Id.
114. INTELLECTUAL PROP. TASK FORCE, U.S. BUS. COAL. FOR TPP, TPP
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY NEGOTIATIONS: KEY GOALS AND OBJECTIVES 2
(n.d.); Rius, supra note 112.
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Trade Representative,115 alludes to mechanisms such as cost-
effective research and reference pricing systems.116
As the TPP inches closer toward becoming a binding
agreement, greater scrutiny of its intellectual property
provisions is needed. Trade agreements where major drug
producing nations act as signatories have a stronger impact
than ever. They can help fulfill TRIPS’ goals or continue to
impede them.
II. THE TRANS-PACIFIC PARTNERSHIP IN A POST-TRIPS
WORLD
A. THE TRANS-PACIFIC PARTNERSHIP: STRUCTURE
The entirety of the TPP’s negotiations is intended to be
confidential. 117 However, concerned citizens such as
Congressman Issa,118 and organizations such as WikiLeaks,119
have released drafts of the intellectual property chapter
allowing the public access to the deleterious intergovernmental
dealings. The most current publicly available draft was
distributed in August 2013 to the Chief Negotiators of the
twelve party nations, which account for approximately forty
percent of the world’s GDP.120 The fact that corporate advisors
are being considered “experts and key negotiators,” the breadth
of these expanded patent rights, and the immense lack of
transparency is likely to lead the United States to push
115. Rius, supra note 112.
116. INTELLECTUAL PROP. TASK FORCE, supra note 114; Thomas A. Faunce
& Ruth Townsend, The Trans-Pacific Partnership Agreement: Challenges for
Australian Health and Medicine Policies, 194 MED. J. AUSTL. 83, 83 (2011).
Reference pricing systems refers to a system that establishes a common
“reimbursement level or reference price for a group of interchangeable
medicines.” Pieter Dylst et al., Reference Pricing Systems in Europe:
Characteristics and Consequences, 1 GENERICS & BIOSIMILARS INITIATIVE J.
127, 127 (2012).
117. Public Interest Analysis of Leaked Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP)
Investment Text, PUB. CITIZEN (June 13, 2012), http://www.citizen
.org/documents/Leaked-TPP-Investment-Analysis.pdf [hereinafter TPP
Investment Text].
118. Press Release, Congressman Darrell Issa, supra note 35.
119. Press Release, WikiLeaks, supra note 36.
120. Id.
2015] PUBLIC HEALTH IMPERATIVE 495
negotiations toward as speedy a conclusion as possible while
maintaining its hard line stance on key provisions.121
The draft, written by the United States,122 begins with
“General Provisions” that describe relevant definitions,
objectives, and principles.123 What follows is a list of articles
relating to trademarks, copyrights, geographic indication and
enforcement, and other areas covered by the TPP. 124 Most
relevant here are the articles under the “General Provisions”
and “Section E: Patents/Undisclosed Test Data/Traditional
Knowledge.”125 These articles reveal a trade deal that greatly
favors the pharmaceutical industry over basic public health
access needs, which will impose a significant burden on
developing nations.126
B. THE TRANS-PACIFIC PARTNERSHIP’S COMMITMENT TO PUBLIC
HEALTH
Article QQ.A.5 of the TPP’s intellectual property chapter
begins with what is now a standard affirmation of the parties’
standing commitment to the Doha Declaration. 127
Acknowledging the commitment made to the WTO’s TRIPS
Agreement nearly fifteen years ago is boilerplate. However, the
article does not include specific language that clarifies the
TPP’s commitment to operationalize the Doha Declaration or
any language that indicates the goal to mitigate the barriers
121. Kevin Drum, Leaked Treaty Puts US Hard Line on Patents and
Copyrights on Public Display, MOTHER JONES (Nov. 15, 2013, 12:00 PM),
http://www.motherjones.com/kevin-drum/2013/11/leaked-treaty-puts-us-hard-l
ine-patents-and-copyrights-public-display (“It’s no surprise that the United
States is pushing the hardest line on IP protections . . . .”); TPP Investment
Text, supra note 117.
122. Julian Assange, US, Australia Isolated in TPP Negotiations,
WIKILEAKS (Nov. 15, 2013), https://wikileaks.org/US-Australia-isolated-in-T
PP.html (“The US appears to be responsible for the base text.”).
123. WIKILEAKS, SECRET TPP TREATY: ADVANCED INTELLECTUAL
PROPERTY CHAPTER FOR ALL 12 NATIONS WITH NEGOTIATING POSITIONS 2–12
(2013) [hereinafter LEAKED IP CHAPTER], available at
https://wikileaks.org/tpp/.
124. Id. at art. QQ.C.1–D.14.
125. Id. at art. QQ.A.3, QQ.E.
126. See id. (granting nations the ability to “provide more extensive
protection for, and enforcement of, intellectual property rights under its law
than is required by this Chapter”).
127. Id. at art. QQ.A.5.
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against TRIPS flexibility utilization in the TPP’s subsequent
proposal.128 Thus, this article is essentially an empty gesture
that ties together a series of aggressive patent provisions that
will likely impede many nations from accessing medicine at a
competitive price point. 129 Including a generic phrase about
commitments to public health and TRIPS is meaningless. The
United States and other negotiating countries should be well
aware that the provision following this article directly
contradicts the goal of TRIPS and Doha. The further away
trade agreements, like the TPP, get from the flexibilities
promised within TRIPS, the more difficult it will be for
developing nations to utilize the public health protections they
are entitled to.130 Including Article QQ.A.5 in the TPP is the
United States’ way of trying to pull the wool over the public’s
eyes.
Article QQ.A.5(b) of the TPP narrows the interpretation of
the compulsory license provisions of TRIPS into a procedurally
tedious entity called the “TRIPS/Health Solution.”131 One of the
main flexibilities TRIPS provides, and one of the major factors
that allows for a semblance of balance between patent rights
and public health rights, is a quick and efficient method to
export and import medicines into countries with insufficient
drug manufacturing capabilities, which is accomplished
through the compulsory licensing. 132 The TRIPS/Health
Solution is a procedurally complex waiver of TRIPS obligations
for a developing nation facing a public health crisis.133 This
waiver requires certain safeguards to be met before a country is
allowed such flexibility. 134 The TRIPS/Health Solution is
burdensome and dizzying; in order to use a compulsory license
a WTO member nation must provide: specification of the
quantities of drugs needed, evidence to establish an inability to
128. See id. (stating only that the intellectual property chapter “does not
and should not prevent the effective utilization of the TRIPS/health solution”).
129. See generally id. (tying together the Doha Declaration and TRIPS).
130. See supra notes 94–100 and accompanying text.
131. LEAKED IP CHAPTER, supra note 123, at art. QQ.A.5(b).
132. Doha Declaration, supra note 72, at paras. 5–6.
133. Rojina Thapa, Waiver Solution in Public Health and Pharmaceutical
Domain Under TRIPS Agreement, 16 J. INTELL. PROP. RIGHTS 470, 472–73
(2011).
134. Id.
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manufacture the drug, a number of notices from an exporting
country, and a guarantee that the drug will be used for public
health services.135 The TRIPS/Health Solution does not provide
instructions or standards as to what kind of evidence would
satisfy such requirements. 136 For a nation facing a public
health epidemic, the TRIPS/Health Solution is no solution at
all.
The TPP’s “benevolent proclamation” to prioritize partner
nations’ efforts to effectively deal with serious public health
issues comes up empty. The affirmation, that the TPP “does not
and should not prevent” access to medicines,137 may set an
unhealthy precedent. Larger drug-producing nations may use
the TPP’s inadequate efforts to uphold public health priorities
as an acceptable standard in future free trade agreements
while piling increasingly aggressive intellectual property
protections after them. Since so much of the TPP’s intellectual
property chapter is an aggregate of TRIPS-plus standards, the
outcome will likely be that drugs will become less available and
priced higher. The TPP seems to define this standard—of only
superficially honoring a country’s ability to utilize TRIPS
flexibilities—as being TRIPS compliant, even under the Doha
Declaration’s clarifying language. The provision, however,
restricts the express language in the Doha Declaration that the
TRIPS flexibilities can and should be fully used.138 The TPP’s
silence speaks volumes about the agreement’s unwillingness to
balance conflicting interests.
C. CHAGASDISEASE AND CHRONIC ILLNESS
Instead of mirroring the balance the TRIPS Agreement
strives for,139 the TPP implicitly limits its language suggesting
that the TRIPS and Doha Declaration flexibilities are available
only for the diseases and conditions enumerated in the
135. Id.
136. E.g., id.
137. LEAKED IP CHAPTER, supra note 123, at art. QQ.A.5(b).
138. Doha Declaration, supra note 72, at para. 4–5; see also LEAKED IP
CHAPTER, supra note 123, at art. QQ.A.3 (granting nations the ability to
provide more extensive IP protections than required under TPP, which may
inherently undermine TRIPS flexibilities).
139. TRIPS Agreement, supra note 11.
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provision. 140 Article QQ.A.5(a) goes on to state, “[t]he
obligations of this Chapter do not and should not prevent a
Party from taking measures to protect public health by
promoting access to medicines for all, in particular concerning
cases such as HIV/AIDS, tuberculosis, malaria, and other
epidemics as well as circumstances of extreme urgency or
national emergency.”141
The prevalence of noncommunicable disease is on the rise
around the world.142 “The global burden of disease is shifting
from infectious diseases to noncommunicable diseases, with
chronic conditions such as heart disease and stroke now being
the chief causes of death globally.” 143 This is particularly
troublesome in low- and middle-income nations where the cost
of medication to treat chronic disease, such as cancers, mental
illness, and heart disease are far too expensive for individual
patients, insurers, and governments. 144 The United States’
history of trying to exclude noninfectious chronic illness from
multinational trade agreements is exemplified in its efforts to
ensure that they were not described as an epidemic or
emergency at the U.N. High Level Meeting on Non-
Communicable Diseases.145
Developing countries also face the persistent consequences
of neglected tropical diseases where newer, and thus more
expensive, treatments will be unaffordable to those most in
140. See LEAKED IP CHAPTER, supra note 123, at art. QQ.A.5(a).
141. Id.
142. See WORLD HEALTH ORG., CHRONIC DISEASES IN LOW AND MIDDLE
INCOME COUNTRIES (2005), available at http://www.who.int/chp/chronic
_disease_report/media/Factsheet3.pdf.
143. Press Release, World Health Org., Noncommunicable Diseases Now
Biggest Killers (May 19, 2008), available at http://www.who.int/mediacentre
/news/releases/2008/pr14/en/.
144. See Dele O. Abegunde et al., The Burden and Costs of Chronic
Diseases in Low-Income and Middle-Income Countries, 370 LANCET 1929, 1936
(2007), available at http://www.who.int/choice/publications/p_2007_Chronic
_disease_burden_Lancet.pdf.
145. William New, Questions Arise Over UN Policy on NonCommunicable
Diseases and IP Rights, INTELL. PROP. WATCH (Sept. 16, 2011), http://www.ip
-watch.org/2011/09/16/questions-arise-over-un-policy-on-non-communicable-di
seases-and-ip-rights/. These efforts were ultimately successful, though there
were two references to countries’ need to use intellectual property flexibilities
to access medicines. G.A. Res. 66/117, U.N. Doc. A/RES/66/L.1 (Sept. 16, 2011),
available at http://www.un.org/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=A/66/L.1.
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need.146 For example, the United States opposes adding Chagas
disease to the list of illnesses the TPP deems to qualify for the
use of TRIPS flexibilities.147
Chagas disease is a deadly infection caused by the protozoan
parasite Trypanosoma cruzi. Afflicting approximately 8 million
people in Latin America, Chagas disease is now becoming a serious
global health problem proliferating beyond the traditional
geographical borders, mainly because of human and vector
migration. The chronic form remains incurable, there are no
vaccines, and 2 existing drugs for the acute form are toxic and have
low efficacy.148
Those drugs also cost upward of $11,000, making them
unaffordable for most.149
Recently, Vanderbilt University and Meharry Medical
College reported “curing both the acute and chronic forms of
the [Chagas] infection in mice with a small molecule, [called]
VNI.” 150 In mice with Chagas disease, “VNI achieved cures
with 100 percent survival and without toxic side effects.”151 The
success of this study has opened a major door for significant
research and development that will likely lead to lucrative
patentability in the near future. The United States has
explicitly opposed adding Chagas to the TPP’s list of diseases
that will grant nations the ability to circumvent certain patent
protections for the sake of public health.152 A country trying to
use a compulsory license for Chagas treatment will have to rely
on the “other epidemic” language from QQ.A.5(a), which will be
much more difficult because of the procedurally tedious nature
of the TRIPS/Health Solution. 153 Considering approximately
600 U.S. corporate advisors have negotiating power and the
146. See infra notes 147–54 and accompanying text.
147. LEAKED IP CHAPTER, supra note 123, at art. QQ.A.5(a).
148. Fernando Villalta et al., VNI Cures the Acute and Chronic
Experimental Chagas Disease, 208 J. INFECTIOUS DISEASES 504, 504 (2013).
149. Katie Moisse, Chagas the New AIDS? Experts Disagree, ABC NEWS
(June 1, 2012, 3:41 PM), http://abcnews.go.com/blogs/health/2012/06/01
/chagas-the-new-aids-experts-disagree/.
150. Bill Snyder, Cure in Sight for Kissing Bug’s Bite, RES. NEWS @ VAND.
(Feb. 15, 2013, 8:00 AM), http://news.vanderbilt.edu/2013/02/chagas-cure-kiss
ing-bug/.
151. Id.
152. See LEAKED IP CHAPTER, supra note 123, at art. QQ.A.5(a) (noting
explicit U.S. opposition to adding Chagas disease to QQ.A.5).
153. Id.; see also discussion supra Part II.B.
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ability to amend proposals that suit their interest, 154 it is
possible that industry lobbying groups such as PhRMA see this
as an opportunity to lock Chagas out of such patent law
circumvention. This could mean future medical developments,
such as VNI, will be priced out of reach for most of the global
population.
D. EXPANDING ON PATENT LINKAGE ANDDATA EXCLUSIVITY
The TPP strives to expand on international patent
protections in two major ways: through patent linkage and test
data exclusivity provisions. 155 Article QQ.E.17 lays out
measures that relate to certain regulated products, particularly
the United States’ proposals for data exclusivity and patent
registration linkage.156 Patent linkage is the concept of linking
marketing approval to patent status, thus giving patent
holders a powerful method to block the entry of low-cost generic
medicine.157 Linkage is not mentioned in TRIPS and is also not
required in most of the TPP negotiating countries,158 however,
154. TPP Investment Text, supra note 117; see Connor Adams Sheets, New
TPP Talks Decried As Most Secretive Discussions of Trans-Pacific Partnership
to Date, INT’L BUS. TIMES (Nov. 22, 2013, 3:22 PM), http://www.ibtimes.com
/new-tpp-talks-decried-most-secretive-discussions-trans-pacific-partnership-da
te-1482970 (“The only thing about the TPP that’s not a secret is who it stands
to benefit: big corporations.”).
155. See infra notes 156–67 and accompanying text.
156. LEAKED IP CHAPTER, supra note 123, at art. QQ.E.17.
157. Ravikant Bhardwaj et al., The Impact of Patent Linkage on Marketing
of Generic Drugs, 18 J. INTELL. PROP. RTS. 316, 316 (2013).
158. See BURCU KILIÇ & PETER MAYBARDUK, PUB. CITIZEN, DANGERS FOR
ACCESS TO MEDICINES IN THE TRANS-PACIFIC PARTNERSHIP AGREEMENT:
COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF THE UNITED STATES’ TPFTA INTELLECTUAL
PROPERTY PROPOSAL AND VIETNAMESE LAW (2011), available at
http://www.citizen.org/documents/Comparative-Analysis-of-the-US-TPFTA-IP
-Proposal-and-Vietnamese-Law.pdf (explaining that “Vietnamese law contains
no provision that links the patent system to the [drug] marketing approval
process” and that many U.S. free trade agreements require patent linkage,
which shifts burdens of early patent enforcement to drug regulatory
authorities); see also BURCU KILIÇ & PETER MAYBARDUK, PUB. CITIZEN,
DANGERS FOR ACCESS TO MEDICINES IN THE TRANS-PACIFIC PARTNERSHIP
AGREEMENT: COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF THE U.S. INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY
PROPOSAL AND AUSTRALIAN LAW (2011), available at
http://www.citizen.org/documents/Australia-TPPA-chart.pdf (explaining that
although “AUSFTA introduced patent linkage in Australia,” Australia sought
to limit its effect through statutory measures imposing penalties for linkage
evergreening and thus, the U.S. Trade Representative attacked these
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the United States has incorporated it into many of its free
trade agreements. 159 Under patent linkage rules a partner
nation’s regulatory authority is required to deny marketing
approval to a generic drug if there is an active patent term for
the original formula.160 The only way around this presumptive
denial is if the pioneer inventor consents to such approval.161
The TPP will allow a company that is in the process of filing a
patent claim to prohibit the regulatory approval of a competitor
without seeking a private enforcement action and without
having to address the validity of its proposed patent claim.162
The likely result of such a provision will be an incentive for
pharmaceutical companies to file frivolous patent claims as a
means to delay marketing approval for the competition.
Generic manufacturers will have to wait out a pharmaceutical
company’s tactics used to delay regulatory review, which could
take years. 163 Adding the cost of litigation and delays that
result from an unconscionable use of the patent system by
original patent holders is likely to deter many generic
manufacturers attempting to enter markets with smaller
populations.
Before TRIPS, most countries allowed what is known as
originator test data, meaning clinical testing data submitted by
pioneer inventors could also be used to demonstrate the efficacy
and safety of a generic drug as long as the generic in question
was chemically identical or bioequivalent.164 The prior lack of
data exclusivity allowed rapid introduction of generics into the
safeguards and therefore, the TPP proposal raises a serious concern that the
United States may seek to limit or eliminate Australian safeguards); BURCU
KILIÇ & PETER MAYBARDUK, PUB. CITIZEN, DANGERS FOR ACCESS TO
MEDICINES IN THE TRANS-PACIFIC PARTNERSHIP AGREEMENT: COMPARATIVE
ANALYSIS OF THE U.S. INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY PROPOSAL AND MALAYSIAN
LAW (2011), available at http://www.citizen.org/documents/malaysia-chart.pdf
(“The Malaysian law contains no provision that links the patent system to
marketing approval process.”).
159. E.g., United States-Korea Free Trade Agreement, U.S.-S. Kor., June
30, 2007, 125 Stat. 428, at art. 18:9(5), available at http://www.ustr.gov/trade
-agreements/free-trade-agreements/korus-fta/final-text.
160. Bhardwaj et al., supra note 157, at 316–18.
161. Sell, supra note 99, at 454.
162. Id. at 453–54.
163. Id.
164. WTO and the TRIPS Agreement, supra note 41.
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market without the need for separate, and costly, test data.165
Data exclusivity standards have posed an obstacle for
flexibilities such as compulsory licenses because of the extra
time generic approvals now require. 166 TRIPS itself only
precludes reliance on undisclosed test data in the regulatory
approval process.167
Facially, the TPP offers a generic provision with respect to
the utilization of data for regulatory approval, 168 and even
includes a boilerplate exception to “protect the public.” 169
However, the TPP provides absolutely no means for the actual
use of data to protect the public.170 TRIPS also failed to identify
such means of action, 171 rendering the data exclusivity
exception ultimately useless. Data exclusivity provisions are
intended to force generic producers to develop their own clinical
test data. 172 This practice is not only a waste of time and
resources, but it will also increase the price of generic
medicines because of the time and money generic producers
will need to spend on duplicative clinical trials and bench
testing.173 Additionally, as intellectual property law Professor
Jerome Reichman explains, restricting the submission of
clinical trial data “could effectively empower rights holders to
negate a state’s ability to authorize marketing approval of
equivalent drugs, for a period from five to ten years.”174
Like other sections of the TPP, 175 the data exclusivity
provision restates that “each Party may take measures to
165. Id.
166. Id.
167. WORLDHEALTHORG. ET AL., supra note 59, at 65.
168. LEAKED IP CHAPTER, supra note 123, at art. QQ.E.XX.4.
169. Id. at art. QQ.E.XX.4(1).
170. See id. at art. QQ.E.XX.4(3) (stating only that nations may take
“measures to protect public health in accordance” with the Doha Declaration,
TRIPS waivers, and amendments to TRIPS itself).
171. Id.
172. Sell, supra note 99, at 453.
173. JEROME H. REICHMAN, UNDISCLOSED CLINICAL TRIAL DATA UNDER
THE TRIPS AGREEMENT AND ITS PROGENY: A BROADER PERSPECTIVE 2–3
(2004), available at http://www.iprsonline.org/unctadictsd/bellagio/docs
/Reichman_Bellagio4.pdf.
174. Id. at 2.
175. LEAKED IP CHAPTER, supra note 123, at art. QQ.A.5, QQ.E.16,
QQ.E.XX.4.
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protect public health in accordance” with the Doha Declaration
and current waivers, including the TRIPS/Health solution.176
This standard text fails to identify concrete ways governments
can override such mandates in order to allow generic medicines
to market more swiftly.177 The TPP should include language
either ensuring rights to gain market approval when a
compulsory or government use license is issued or the provision
should include an explicit exception to the data exclusivity and
patent linkage standard, thus giving generic manufacturers a
way to enter the market as soon as the original patent holder’s
rights expire.178
Such exceptions are not out of the ordinary. In fact, the
New Trade Policy of 2007 led to revisions of the United States’
free trade agreements with Panama, Peru, and Columbia.179
These revisions gave explicit guidance on how to operationalize
a public health exception to data exclusivity and patent linkage
rules.180 According to a Doctors Without Borders Issue Brief:
The agreement specifies that the USTR [United States Trade
Representative] should modify its intellectual property demands in
trade agreement negotiations so that important public health
safeguards are included. Yet in several meetings with U.S. civil
176. Id. at art. QQ.E.XX.4(3).
177. See supra notes 170–71 and accompanying text.
178. See generally Brook K. Baker, Leaked TPP Investment Chapter
Presents a Grave Threat to Access to Medicines, HEALTH GAP GLOBAL ACCESS
PROJECT (Aug. 14, 2012), http://infojustice.org/wp-content/uploads/2012
/09/Baker-Investment-in-the-TPP.pdf (discussing “four main dangers” present
in the current version of the TPP’s IP chapter); Mike Palmedo, AARP to
Obama Administration: Trans Pacific Partnership Should Not Require 12
Years of Data Exclusivity for Biologic Drugs, INFOJUSTICE (Oct. 24, 2013),
http://infojustice.org/archives/31052 (summarizing the AARP’s opposition to
the TPP’s data exclusivity provisions).
179. See Christoph Spennemann, Legal Expert, Intellectual Prop. Unit Div.
on Inv. & Enter., Address at the 2008 United Nations Conference on Trade
and Development: Protection of Pharmaceutical Test Data Under TRIPS and
FTAs (Apr. 2008), available at http://www.ictsd.org/downloads/2010/01/test
-data-under-trips-and-ftas-rev.pdf (providing that linkage is optional). See
generally MÉDECINS SANS FRONTIERES, HOW THE TRANS-PACIFIC
PARTNERSHIP AGREEMENT THREATENS ACCESS TO MEDICINES (2011),
available at http://www.msfaccess.org/sites/default/files/MSF_assets/Access
/Docs/Access_Briefing_TPP_ENG_2011.pdf (discussing the 2007 New Trade
Policy as a bipartisan U.S. Congressional agreement, signed by the Bush
Administration to “scale-back the harshest IP protections in order to strike a
better balance between protection of IP and public health needs”).
180. SeeMÉDECINS SANS FRONTIERES, supra note 179.
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society, the USTR has stated on the record that they are considering
options in the TPP that would shift U.S. policy away from the 2007
New Trade Policy.181
Patent linkage and data exclusivity provisions will likely
result in needless replication of data. These provisions also
allow the pharmaceutical industry to use unconscionable
tactics to keep generic competitors out of the market, even after
the preliminary patent term expires, all while governments
with populations in need of a cheaper alternative to pioneer
drugs have to wait for new test data to be developed.182 This
could ultimately result in a reduction of competition and
continued limited access.
E. DEFINING PATENTABILITY CRITERIA
The TPP also attempts to take away a member nation’s
ability to determine its own standards for patentability, which
is an express right afforded to TRIPS member nations. 183
Perhaps the most disconcerting component of the TPP’s
intellectual property chapter is article QQ.E.1(1)(b) which
states, “a Party may not deny a patent solely on the basis that
the product did not result in enhanced efficacy of the known
product when the applicant has set forth distinguishing
features establishing that the invention is new, involves an
inventive step, and is capable of industrial application.”184 This
particular provision of the TPP is proposed only by the United
States and Japan, with every other member nation opposed.185
Lowering patentability standards too much tends to restrict
innovation.186 Advocates for access to medicine argue that it
allows pharmaceutical companies to delay generic entry
181. Id.
182. Carlos María Correa, Implications of Bilateral Free Trade Agreements
on Access to Medicines, 84 BULL. WORLDHEALTHORG. 399, 401 (2006).
183. TRIPS Agreement, supra note 11, at art. 1 (“Members shall be free to
determine the appropriate method of implementing the provisions of this
Agreement within their own legal system and practice.”).
184. LEAKED IP CHAPTER, supra note 123, at art. QQ.E.1(1)(b).
185. Id.
186. See Parker Higgins & Maira Sutton, TPP Leak Confirms the Worst:
US Negotiators Still Trying to Trade Away Internet Freedoms, ELECTRONIC
FRONTIER FOUND. (Nov. 13, 2013), https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2013/11/tpp
-leak-confirms-worst-us-negotiators-still-trying-trade-away-internet-freedoms.
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through what is known as “evergreening.”187 This deceptive
industry technique is the practice of making minor, often
arbitrary, modifications to a drug and seeking patent
protection for the article, regardless of whether they offer any
therapeutic efficacy for patients.188 It allows pharmaceutical
companies to extend their monopoly protection for old drugs by
making small changes to existing formulas.189 This abuse of the
patent system directly slows the ability of generic
manufacturers to get their products to market.190 TRIPS does
not require patent protection of new uses, or new forms of
known substances. 191 Additionally, under TRIPS, countries
have sufficient leeway to define patentability criteria; for
example, to only grant patents for truly innovative products
and to exclude certain products from patentability
altogether. 192 The patentability standards in the TPP are
directly contradictory to TRIPS, which allows countries to set
their own standards.193 The U.S. proposal, that efficacy need
not be shown for the grant of a patent, directly contradicts a
country’s right to determine what passes patentable muster.194
This provision of the TPP essentially gives pharmaceutical
companies the advantage of capitalizing on old formulas while
locking generic formulas out of the market entirely.
The United States further proposes that patents should be
made available for inventions of biological products made from
plants and animals as well as diagnostic and surgical
methods.195 Article 27 of TRIPS explicitly states, “[m]embers
187. WORLDHEALTHORG. ET AL., supra note 59, at 131.
188. COMMISSION REPORT ON IP RIGHTS, supra note 102, at 131–32.
189. WORLDHEALTHORG. ET AL., supra note 59, at 131.
190. MÉDECINS SANS FRONTIERES, supra note 179.
191. WORLD HEALTH ORG. ET AL., supra note 59, at 131–32. See generally
TRIPS Agreement, supra note 11 (providing no such provisions throughout the
agreement).
192. See Roger Kampf, Counsellor, World Trade Org. Secretariat, Address
at the World Intellectual Property Organization Regional Seminar for Certain
Latin American and Caribbean Countries on the Implementation and Use of
Several Patent Related-Flexibilities: Patent-Related Flexibilities in the TRIPS
Agreement (Feb. 2012), available at http://www.wipo.int/edocs/mdocs/mdocs
/en/wipo_ip_bog_12/wipo_ip_bog_12_ref_t6_kampf.pdf.
193. See supra notes 183–92 and accompanying text.
194. LEAKED IP CHAPTER, supra note 123, at art. QQ.E.1(1)(b).
195. Id. at art. QQ.E.1(3)(a)–(c).
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may also exclude from patentability: (a) diagnostic, therapeutic
and surgical methods for the treatment of humans or animals;
(b) plants and animals other than micro-organisms, and
essentially biological processes for the production of plants or
animals other than non-biological and microbiological
processes.”196 A number of multilateral and bilateral free trade
agreements, including the North American Free Trade
Agreement, reinforce article 27 of TRIPS.197 In fact, the only
countries where patenting a medical procedure is legal is the
United States and Australia. 198 Over eighty nations have
banned the practice of patenting medical procedures, diagnostic
methods, and surgical methods.199
Since the TPP’s intellectual property chapter dictates that
nations party to the TPP should make patents available for
such medical procedures, diagnostic methods, and surgical
methods there is an inherent conflict between rights
guaranteed by TRIPS.200 The World Medical Association came
out against the proposition of forcing countries to allow
patenting diagnostic and surgical methods, stating, “patenting
of medical procedures poses serious risks to the effective
practice of medicine by potentially limiting the availability of
new procedures to patients . . . . [P]atenting of medical
procedures is unethical and contrary to the values of the
medical profession.” 201 Similarly, the American Academy of
Orthopedic Surgeons has also opposed the practice, stating that
“[t]he granting of Medical Procedure Patents may pose a
serious threat to medical advancement, medical education, and
patient care, as well as contribute to the spiraling costs of
196. TRIPS Agreement, supra note 11, at art. 27.3(a)–(b).
197. E.g., North American Free Trade Agreement art. 1709(3)(a), Dec. 17,
1992, 32 I.L.M. 605, at 673; United States-Colombia Free Trade Agreement,
U.S.-Colom., art.16.9(2), Nov. 22, 2006, available at http://www.ustr.gov/trade
-agreements/free-trade-agreements/colombia-fta/final-text.
198. Priyanka Rastogi, World Wide Legal Status of Medical Method
Patents: An Overview, MONDAQ, http://www.mondaq.com/india/x/311404
/Patent/World+Wide+Legal+Status+Of+Medical+Method+Patents+An+Overvi
ew (last updated May 6, 2014).
199. Id.; see WORLD MED. ASS’N, STATEMENT ON PATENTING MEDICAL
PROCEDURES 1 (2009), available at http://www.wma.net/en/30publications
/10policies/m30/ (“Over 80 countries prohibit medical procedure patents.”).
200. See supra notes 195–99 and accompanying text.
201. WORLDMED. ASS’N, supra note 199, at 4.
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health care.”202 Allowing patents for diagnostic and surgical
methods will increase the cost of medical practice, apart from
the price of medicine.203 This provision would also rob a country
of its right to dictate what is best for its own national policy.
The United States is the only negotiating country in support of
this provision; every other party is opposed.204 The TPP’s plan
to lower patentability criteria to such a degree will be very
damaging to the practice of medicine and the availability of
generic medical alternatives.
III. BEFORE IT IS TOO LATE . . .
There is little doubt that the TPP, once effective, will have
a resounding impact on the global economy. As discussed, the
TPP’s intellectual property chapter contains numerous
aggressive provisions that do a severe disservice to millions of
people whose voices are not represented in the negotiations.205
The TPP’s proposed data exclusivity rule, promotion of patent-
linkage, lower patentability standards, lack of focus on chronic
illness, as well as its decision not to balance public health
interests with its aggressive intellectual property agenda make
the proposed trade deal a divisive one.
Trade negotiations involving public health must include at
least some degree of transparency. The TPP should allow for
meaningful congressional and public scrutiny and allow access
to negotiation texts. Negotiators should strongly pursue an
agreement that does not call for such an array of extreme
TRIPS-plus provisions. Above all else, it is imperative for
negotiating countries to use the TPP as an opportunity to
renew a global commitment toward improving access to
affordable medication. Ensuring the final text is aligned with
the global public health priorities made in the 2001 WTO Doha
Declaration on TRIPS and Public Health is a critical step
toward equity in the TPP.
202. AM. ACAD. OF ORTHOPAEDIC SURGEONS, OPINIONS ON ETHICS AND
PROFESSIONALISM: MEDICAL AND SURGICAL PROCEDURE PATENTS (2009),
available at http://www.aaos.org/about/papers/ethics/1209eth.asp.
203. See generally id. (highlighting the potential for such patents to impede
the ability of medical providers in the orthopaedic context to assure “the
highest quality and most cost-effective musculoskeletal health care”).
204. LEAKED IP CHAPTER, supra note 123, at art. QQ.E.1(3).
205. See supra Part II.
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Thirteen years ago the international community, including
the United States, vowed to address the growing injustice
many face around the world. This promise is embodied in
numerous human rights declarations as well as TRIPS and the
Doha Declaration. The TRIPS legacy is littered with
complexities and tedious restrictions making access to
affordable medicine a continuing global problem. The TPP is
not just another empty gesture; it is a blatant and shameful
attempt to place intellectual property rights above human
rights. If the TPP goes ahead as is, it will set a precedent we, as
global citizens, cannot afford to support.
